By Mamadi Cora
In a recent panel on Gambia, Coach Pa Samba Jow noted that some people say that Jammeh and the APRC do not want elections. The coach went on to say that he completely disagrees with this observation. Instead, he argued that Jammeh and the APRC do indeed want elections, and desperately so. The key point, the coach argued, is that Jammeh and the APRC just don’t want “free and fair elections.”
Assuming the good Coach is correct in his observation, his comments have important implications for the political process underway in Gambia. One such implications is playing itself out in Gambia right at this moment: word that the remaining Gambian politicians are currently engaged (or are thinking of engaging) with APRC in an “inter-party” political dialogue. The “objective” of this “inter-party” dialogue is to supposedly come up with a “workable” way forward to the 2016 elections.
As Gambians, an important question that should immediately come to mind is to what end? What might the opposition gain from participating in these “inter-party dialogues”? And more broadly, what might the opposition gain in participating in the upcoming elections without further meaningful reforms? The good coach’s observations suggest one obvious answer: the dialogues have the clear potential of providing a platform for legitimizing a process that has now been shown to be particularly wanting. It cannot escape any Gambian that the recent torture and killing of Solo Sanding and the events that followed it have finally brought the Gambia and the APRC government under intensive international scrutiny. I only point to the many condemnations/declarations from the United Nations, the EU, the United States, Amnesty International and a multitude of human rights organizations (For a recent example, see the motion on Gambia put forth by a group of parliamentarians in the British parliament <http://www.parliament.uk/edm/print/2016-17/359).
Arguably, then, the coach’s observations are distinctly on point: Jammeh and the APRC do indeed desperately need elections, and more than ever. The sole aim of any “inter-party dialogue”, at least from their perspective, is to, yet again, provide legitimacy to a now clearly illegitimate political process. In other words, the opposition is sure to lose, and lose they will; and the only outcome that can be expected from these dialogues, and indeed the upcoming elections without real reforms, is giving legitimacy to a process that has now truly been shown to otherwise lack legitimacy.
Military coup leaders that have come to power in Africa by force have learned this well about Africans: you can easily use them as an instrument of legitimacy by noting that you are not there to “stay in power.” That your only objective is to “provide a transition to democracy.” Time and time again, would be military leaders have successfully used this and ploys like it, to provide legitimacy to themselves, while actually solidifying their grip on power. Because as George Orwell put it well over half a century ago in his now classic political satire, 1984: “one ever ceases power with the intension of relinquishing it. Power is not a means. It is an end. One does not established a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution. One makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.” The period of “transition to democracy,” in turn, only serves to give the junta time to solidify power.
The foundational principle of any working liberal democracy is limited government. As John Stuart Mill put it almost two centuries ago (1859):”the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise…The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.” The question that immediately arises is how does one make recommendations for limited government to a group of people whose sole concern is to maximize power?
To be sure, the first Gambian constitution was formulated under conditions that are ideal for the creation of a solid governing document: a country that just acquired independence from an exploitative, distant society; a group of people who vehemently advocated for that independence and who were assuredly determined to build a new nation (the U.S. Constitution was formulated under similar conditions). Undoubtedly, folks like Pa Edwards Small had one objective in mind at the time: to create a government and governing instruments that they most certainly needed to work for Gambia. Their very reputations were hanging in the balance: the question of whether or not agitators of self-governance for African countries can in fact govern their respective countries independent of their colonial masters was a recurring one. The creators of the founding Gambian Constitution, therefore, had every reason to give if all they had.
The question then arises, why did the Gambia need a “new” constitution when one was already in place? The conditions under which the “new” Gambian constitution was formulated were arguably not particularly ideal for the creation/continuation of a liberal democracy (A state that guarantees fundamental human rights to its citizens, who recurrently elect their leaders): the sole objective of any military junta is to consolidate power so as to perpetuate themselves. And the single obstacle to that objective is lack of legitimacy from the eyes of the public. Processes that such junta put in place therefore necessarily have the single objective of acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of fellow country men and women (but especially in the eyes of the international community—after all, international organizations are the life line for African governments).
Now some Gambians are being asked to join an “inter-party dialogue”. What all well-meaning Gambians must ask, and with all the vigor that can be mustered, is to what end? Arguably, with no a-priori clear and demonstrably real reforms, participating in the current political process can have one and only one outcome: provide legitimacy to a process that has now been shown to be demonstrably wanting (both in the eyes of internal and external audiences). For how does one have a fair chance at a game in which the rules of engagement are continually shifting, and under the continual definition/redefinition of one’s opponent?
But is it all doom and gloom? To the contrary! The recent events in Gambia have succeeded in mobilizing Gambians, especially those in the diaspora, in ways that we have never seen. The task at hand is to amplify that mobilization effort and make sure that it persists: The situation in Gambia is now poignantly on the international map; Gambians in the diaspora must make sure that it not only remains there, but pointedly so! This means continually using all available avenues: working with any and all international organizations that can be brought to the Gambian cause (should international organizations keep sending money in the name of Africans, money that many never benefit from?); using international law to further that cause; deploying the power of social media in all activities directed toward the Gambian cause; amplifying use of the now many “Gambian” online radios; etc. It also means continually documenting and bringing to international scrutiny anything and all that happens in Gambia. Finally, it also means making it clear to participants in Gambia that they are and will be held accountable. Because, as noted conservative journalist and commentator George Will once observed, mistake/actions without consequences are bound to be repeated.
On the other hand, should one expect much from the average Gambian on the ground today? The answer to this question, at least from my humble perspective, is an unambiguous no! Because, as Willer and his colleagues (2014) observe, the secret of how power is exercised in social structures is that: “Power structures make those high in power obstinate and those low in power obedient…Power structures connect social relations in such a way that high-power actors face little or no loss upon disagreeing with those low in power, while, in the same process, the opportunities for better agreements for those low in power shrink to nothing. The pairing of obstinacy with obedience in exchange structures results in exchange ratios favoring the obstinate high-power actor over the obedient low-power actor. Similarly, the same pairing in coercive structures results in heightened levels of coercive exploitation favoring obstinate coercer over obedient coercee.” (Pp. 178-179). The key here is “exclusion.” An individual who has the ability to exclude others has virtually unlimited power over those individuals. The average Gambian on the ground has been gradually but systematically reduced to absolute and complete dependence—to the point of subsistence. Therefore his/her sole concern is day-by-day survival, meaning, not to be excluded. Exclusion could mean life or death. Asking such an individual to dedicate part of his thoughts to good governance is like asking a person on the verge of drowning to think about how good his/her life might be if he/she succeed from not drowning. The sole concern of the person on the verge of drowning is to avoid being swept away by the tides to see. The sole concern of the average Gambian is similarly to simply survive from one day to another. As the saying goes, “a hungry man is an angry man.” To this it can be added “a hungry man has less time, if any, to think.” It follows that, like it or not, the job remains mostly Gambian Diasporas!